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MALONEY v. ELMHURST PARK DISTRICT: PARK
DISTRICT TORT IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS
THE FUNCTIONAL DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION

Only five years after the Illinois Supreme Court in Harvey
v. Clyde Park District declared section 12.1-1 of the Chicago
Park District Code as special legislation and therefore unconstitutional,' section 3-106 of the 1965 Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act was held constitutional in Maloney v. Elmhurst Park District.2 The court
in Maloney distinguished the Harvey case and ruled that a provision which is based on the function of the local governmental
entity creates neither an arbitrary nor capricious secondary
classification of persons.3
Part I of this article is an historical analysis of the Harvey
decision: its application of the special legislation clause in the
1870 Illinois Constitution and the functional guideline described
by that court. Included in part I is a discussion of the principle
applications of the Harvey decision prior to Maloney. Part II
is concerned with: 1) an analysis of the Maloney decision as
it follows the Harvey test, and 2) an analysis of the functional
test as applied to section 3-106. Finally, part III recognizes the
recent advancements made in the area of park district tort
immunity.
I. HISTORY
HARVEY, SPECIAL LEGISLATION AND THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The case of Harvey v. Clyde Park District was the first
major judicial attack against local government immunity in the
wake of the Molitor decision.4 The Harvey application of section 22 of article IV of the 1870 Illinois Constitution prohibiting
special legislation not only operated to strike down section 12.1-1
of the Park District Code, but provided a guideline for future
attacks against special laws which arbitrarily classified plaintiffs
or defendants. 5
132 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).

2 47 Ill. 2d 367, 265 N.E.2d 654 (1970).

8 Id. at 370, 265 N.E.2d at 655.

4 Molitor

v. Kaneland Community School District No. 302, 18 I1. 2d

11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).

This landmark decision abolishing school district

immunity was the major reason for the General Assembly's subsequent
enactment of a variety of tort immunity legislation. The legislation soon
became the subject of repeated judicial attack under section 22 of article IV
of the 1870 Illinois Constitution.
'Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill. 2d 60, 67, 203 N.E.2d 573, 577
(1964).
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In Harvey, an action was instituted on behalf of William
Harvey, a minor, to recover damages for injuries alleged to have
been caused by the negligence of the defendant, Clyde Park
District, in maintaining its playground facilities." The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it was
immune from liability by reason of section 12.1-1 of the Park
District Code which provided:
Any park district shall not be liable for any injuries to person
or property, or for the death of any person heretofore or hereafter
caused by or resulting from the negligence of its agents, servants,
officers or employees in the operation or maintenance of any
property, equipment or facility under the jurisdiction, control or
custody of the park district or otherwise by the acts or conduct of
such agents, servants, officers or employees. 7
The defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was sustained,
and the plaintiff brought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
of Illinois contending that such provision was violative of article
IV, section 22 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution 8 and so extended
a "special or exclusive privilege" to such park district.
The determinative question of law was whether the provision was
rational in that it created neither an arbitrary nor capricious
classification.9
In referring to article IV, section 22, the court said, "This
provision prevents the enlargement of the rights of one or more
persons in discrimination against the rights of others."' 10 Harvey
pursued to emphasize the fortuitive nature of the principle situation and its amenability to that which arose in Grasse v. Dealers
Transport Co." Relying on Grasse, the court acknowledged that
6 Id. at 60, 203 N.E.2d at 573.
7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, §12.1-1 (repealed 1967).
8
ILL. CONST. art. IV, §22 (1870) provided:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any

of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: For .

.

. [g]ranting

to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege,
immunity or franchise whatsoever.
9 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 64, 203 N.E.2d 573, 575
(1964).
10 Id. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 575.
11412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
The situation in this case is not unlike that which was before this
court in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. Section 29 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act allowed a common law action by an employee who was
injured by the negligence of a third party who was not bound by the act,
but prohibited such an action by an employee who was injured by the
negligence of a third party who was bound by the act. The distinction
between the two types of defendants was held insufficient to afford a
rational basis of classification from the point of view of the injured
person. The court said: "All employees entitled to compensation for
injuries sustained in the course of their employment and caused by
third persons are not treated alike. Those injured by third party tortfeasors bound by the act are not entitled to common law damages from
such persons, whereas those injured by third party tortfeasors not
bound by the act are allowed to institute actions for damages. Both
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the determination as to whether a statute was special legislation
did not merely depend upon the classification of governmental
units. The court stated therein:
For more is involved here than just the classification of governmental units. Those persons who are injured by the negligence of
particular governmental units are also classified, and section 22
the granting of special or exclusive priviof article 1V prohibits
12
leges to individuals.
Seemingly, the Harvey court understood that if it was to be
assumed that some distinction between persons could be made,
even to intimate that the rights of one individual or class should
be differentiated from the rights of another without a rational
reason would reduce equal protection to a mere frivolity.
Harvey recognized that the essence of article IV, section
22 was the necessary differentiation between reasonable and
arbitrary classifications. The court gave the following representative example of the question presented:
If the child involved in the present case had been injured on
a slide negligently maintained in a park operated by a city or
village there is no legislative impediment to full recovery. If the
child had been injured on a slide negligently maintained by a school
district, or by the sovereign State, limited recovery is permitted.
But if the child had been injured on a slide negligently maintained
by a forest preserve district, or, as was actually the case, by a park
district, the legislature has barred recovery. In this pattern there
is no discernible relationship to the realities of life. We hold,
therefore, that the statute relied upon by the defendant is arbitrary
and unconstitutionally discriminates against the plaintiff.13
Thus, the court advanced the argument that would be used

in subsequent cases concerning the constitutionality of the various immunity acts. That is, if the statute either discriminates
against a class of plaintiffs by failing to provide for similar
classes of injured employees may be entitled to compensation from
their own employers, so the amount of compensation, if any, received
by the injured employee is not the basis for differentiation between the
classes. Nor is there any basis for differentiation from the nature of
the injuries sustained, or from the activity of the employee at the time
of the injury, or from any other factor ordinarily related to an injured
party's right to recover damages. The sole basis for differentiation,
as far as the injured employee is concerned, is a fortuitous circumstance
-whether the third party tortfeasor happens to be under the act.
It is readily apparent that there is no rational difference between
an employee injured in the course of his employment by a motorbus, and
one injured by a farmer's truck. Each may sustain the same injuries,
and be entitled to the same amount of compensation from their employers; neither had any control over the circumstances of their injuries,
or the status of the party who hit them, yet in one case the statute
authorizes the employee to recover damages from the third party, and
in the other case the employee must be content with the amount of compensation he may be entitled to receive from his employer.
12 Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill. 2d 60, 65, 203 N.E.2d 573,
576 (1964).
13 Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577. (Emphasis added.)
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recovery to such persons in like circumstances, or if the statute
classifies governmental entities performing the same governmental function, then the statute is unconstitutional as special
legislation.

More importantly, the Harvey court did not stop at striking down section 12.1-1, but rather concluded the opinion with
an amplification of the significance of its decision by providing a
guideline whereby future similar legislation could be general,

uniform in application and reasonable in classification.
court stated:

The

From this decision it does not follow that no valid classifications for purposes of municipal tort liability are possible. On the
contrary it is feasible, and it may be thought desirable, to classify
in terms of types of muncipal function, instead of classifying
among different
governmental agencies that perform the same
14
function.

In this obiter dicta, the court suggested that the statutory
differentiation should be based on governmental function rather
than on the nature of the public entity performing the function
as was the prior statutory pattern.'5 Since the function of the
park district was to provide recreational facilities, all other
local

governmental

entities

providing

the

same

function

should enjoy the identical statutory assurance of tort immunity.
Thus, the Harvey decision served two vital purposes: first, it
analyzed and applied section 22, and secondly, it expressed how
such future legislation could be reasonable if defined func-

tionally.
6
PRINCIPAL APPLICATIONS OF HARVEY PRIOR TO MALONEY'

The court in Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit
School District17 extended Harvey by specifying that any statute
which applied to a procedural right granted to some plaintiffs
but not to others, under substantially like circumstances, should
be held unconstitutional as violative of article IV, section 22.
14 Id.
15 For example,
school districts and non-profit private schools were
afforded a liability ceiling of $10,000 and were further protected by a one
year statute of limitations provision and a six-month notice of suit provision.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §821-31 (1963).
Forest preserve districts had no
liability for negligence at all. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 571/2, §3(a) (1963). A
maximum liability of $10,000 was established for county superintendents
of highways. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, §381-87 (1963).
Park districts
and counties had general immunity from negligence actions. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 105, §12.1-1 (1963).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §301.1 (1963).
16 See, Expanding Application of the Special Legislation Clause of the

Illinois Constitution, 3 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 96 (1969).
reviews the recent cases applying section 22. Id. at 104.

17 35 111. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966).

The author

372
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The plaintiff, a private kindergarten teacher who had received
injuries due to the alleged negligence of the school district,
failed to give timely notice of injury required by the Illinois
18
statute.
As in Harvey, the determinative question was whether the
statute created either a reasonable or arbitrary classification
upon persons similarly situated. 19 Relying on Harvey in its
supporting reasoning, the Lorton court adopted and applied a
justifying, yet similar, analogy as that used in Harvey stating:
We believe the rationale of Harvey is controlling here, for if
plaintiff's injury had occurred upon the property of a county, township, or drainage district, her cause of action would not have been
barred by failure to file written notice within six months of the
injury. If, however, the injury had occurred upon the property
of a city or village, public or private school, as was actually the
case, or the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the failure to file
written notice within six months from the date of injury would
wholly bar her from recovery. As in Harvey, there is in20 this
pattern "no discernible relationship to the realities of life."
It is pertinent to note the use of the statement "no discernible relationship to the realities of life" quoted from Harvey.21
Although no precise definition is given, it would seem that it is
a conclusory statement in regard to the rational - arbitrary
dichotomy. That is, a statute which creates a class by arbitrarily legislating for the benefit of another is unreasonable
and has no discernible relationship to the realities of life since
members of the former class may have as much a prospective
chance of being affected by the statute as those of the latter.
Moreover, the Lorton court did not hold the notice provision unconstitutional simply because there was a classification.
Mere classification will not result in a statute being declared
special legislation unless such a classification is not made in
proper regard to the purpose of the statute. A provision which
classifies one group of persons is constitutional as a general law
if the reason for the classification lies within the purpose and
ch. 122 §§823-24 (1963).
19Lorton v. Brown County Community School Dist., 35 Ill. 2d 362, 366,
220 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1966). The court stated:
The courts of this state must be open to all those similarly situated
upon the same conditions and where procedures are provided which are
applicable to some and not applicable to others under substantially like
circumstances and there are no discernible logical reasons apparent for
the variations, they must fall as violative of section 22 of article IV of
the Illinois Constitution.
20 Id. at 365-366, 220 N.E.2d at 163.
(Emphasis added.)
21 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 67, 203 N.E.2d 573, 577
(1964).
18 ILL. REV. STAT.
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purview of the statute.2 2 But, here, the court found that there
was no rational distinction between the purpose of the legislation
and the persons so classified.
The effect of Harvey was soon felt again in Hutchings v.
Kraject.23 The court declared a 1961 amendment to the Counties Act immunizing counties from liability for personal
injuries, property damage and death caused by the negligence
of their agents as a violation of article IV, section 22, and
therefore unconstitutional. 24 The plaintiff filed a negligence
action against the county of Richland alleging that a surgical
sponge was left in the plaintiff's chest following an operation in
the Richland Memorial Hospital maintained and operated by the
county. The plaintiff relied on Harvey in her attack on the
25
amendment.
The court first answered the plaintiff's contentions by reiterating the general principles of legislative power in regard

to classification. Although not necessary to the disposition of
the case, the court stated:
The legislature has a wide range of discretion in making
classifications, that one questioning its judgment has the burden
of showing it to be clearly erroneous or its discretion arbitrarily
abused, and that the legislature is not required to be scientific or
logical in its classification if the legislation operates equally on all
persons in the class to 26which it applies even though another class
is not treated the same.

In this judicial dictum, the court is saying what Lorton implicitly said; that mere classification is not per se special legislation
22 See Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in the Illinois Cases, 1 ILL.

L. REv. 63 (1906), in which this proposition is discussed. Kales extracted
three principles concerning special legislation which became the foundation
of judicial interpretation of section 22 of article IV of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution. He states:
First: If there is a rational ground for legislating in behalf of the
objects to which the Act applies and not for others of the same general
sort, and if the rationale of the distinction is embodied in the Act's
description of the objects themselves to which it applies, then the Act
is not a 'local or special' law.
Id. at 66-67. He continues:
Second: If there be no rational ground of distinction, on any view of the
facts, upon which some objects are legislated for and others of the same

general sort are not, the Act is a 'local and special' law.
Id. at 70. Finally he states:

Third: Even if there be one or more rational grounds for legislating in
behalf of the objects to which the Act applies and not for others of the
same general sort, yet if no rational ground is embodied in the Act's
description of the objects to which it applies the Act is held to be 'local
or special'."

Id. at 76.
23
24

(Emphasis added.)

34 Ill. 2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34 §301.1 (1963).

25 Note 23 supra.
26 Id. at 380, 215 N.E.2d

at 274.

174
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where the classification is a reasonable result of the purpose of
the statute.
With neither obscurity nor uncertainty, Hutchings cited
Harvey as being controlling and recognized the infirmity of this
type of legislation in its classifying governmental units without
regard to similarity of function.2 7 The court decisively followed
Harvey's guideline for statute uniformity by implicitly stating
that a statute which classifies all governmental units by function
is a general law, uniform in nature and in no way arbitrary or
capricious.
The proposition that a special law which classifies on the
basis of a rational and realistic purpose in accord with a valid
legislative intent will be unheld as constitutional was espoused
28
in Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School District.
Here,
the defendant school district asked for leave to file a third-party
counterclaim against its employee, a physical education instructor. The school district appealed from a judgment in the lower
court denying the school the right to receive damages from the
teacher since he was entitled to indemnification for any loss he
29
would sustain from the suit.

The direct appeal questioned the validity of section 10-21.6
of the School Code which gave a right of indemnification to such
teachers who were employed in a district having a population of
less than 500,000.0 The court ruled that a classification based on
population, where the purpose and intent of such a classification
was reasonable, was not in violation of article IV, section 22.
Consequently, the Treece court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the difference between the duties imposed on school boards,
to indemnify in one case and to insure in the other, based on
population violated section 22 of article IV.31 Moreover, judicial
countenance was accorded the legislative intent and purpose
Id. at 380, 215 N.E.2d at 275. The court stated therein:
Those persons who are injured by the negligence of particular
governmental units are also classified, and section 22 of article IV
prohibits the granting of 'special or exclusive' privileges to individuals.
* * * And to the extent that recovery is permitted or denied on an
arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted in violation of section 22
of article IV. The infirmity of this legislation lies in classifying govern27

mental units as such without regard to similarity of function.
28
2 9

39 Ill. 2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968).
1d.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 §10-21.6 (1965).
31 Note 29 supra at 141, 233 N.E.2d at 552. The court stated:
The controlling rule is well established that: 'Classification on the basis
of population is not objectionable where there is reasonable basis therefore in view of the object and purpose to be accomplished by the legislation and such an act is not local or special merely because it operates
3o

in only one place, if that is where the conditions necessary to its operation exist.'
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of the statute which was to give the employee the benefit of
liability insurance from districts with populations of more than
500,000, while recognizing that school districts with populations
of less than 500,000 could not afford such insurance and would
therefore be liable for indemnification in respect to sued employees. Of course, those persons outside the classified group are
not entitled to the same rights. However, section 22 does not
strike down such a classification since it is both reasonable and
rational and the problems of3 2 the school district may only be
soluble by such classification.
Harvey was then extended in Begich v. Industrial Commission.33 The question presented was whether the provision in
section 8 (e) 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act which limits
recovery to compensation for the loss of a hand, though a part
of the forearm has been removed for the purpose of permitting
the use of an artificial member, was constitutional.', Plaintiff,
who had such an amputation, contended that the statute created
an arbitrary classification of persons similarly situated. 35
Further, those persons with essentially the same loss were prejudiced simply because their original injury occurred four inches
too low, even though it resulted in the identical loss of an extremity.
In its decisive utterance, the court stated that the differentiation of persons who suffer traumatic amputations at the forearm from those whose forearms are amputated for the purpose
of permitting the use of an artificial member is arbitrary and
unreasonable. The court stated:
Here, the classification of employees such as the appellant is
based on the situs of the trauma without regard to the final disability or loss incurred as a result of the employment injury. We
cannot find a reasonable basis for differentiating between the
appellant's class and those who lost the use of an arm solely through
trauma. The attempted classification is unrealistic or, as we put
it in Harvey, does not bear any "discernible relationship to the
realities of life." 36

32 Id. at 399.
3342 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
34
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §138.8(e)9 (1967).

3 Note 33 supra.
36 Id. at 37, 245 N.E.2d at 459.

;76
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ANALYSIS

AN APPLICATION OF HARVEY

In December of 1970, the Supreme Court of Illinois in
3 7 upheld the constitutionality
Maloney v. Elmhurst Park District,
of section 3-106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act.38 That section provides:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable
for an injury where the liability is based on the existence of a
condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used
as a park, playground or open area for recreational purposes unless
wilful and wanton
such local entity or public employee is guilty 3of
9
negligence proximately causing such injury.

The plaintiff, by his next friend, brought a direct appeal
from an order of the Circuit Court which granted judgment on
the pleadings in favor of the defendant park district in an action
for personal damages sustained by the plaintiff, a minor, while
he was playing in the defendant's park facility. 40 Plaintiff alleged that while playing on an "artificial hill" he fell and
was severely injured. Further, it was contended that the hill
was allowed to remain in a dangerous condition in that no
fencing was provided, that it was ungraded and that rocks
and other debris were allowed to remain thereon. The defendant answered by stating that under the Tort Immunity Act
a park district could not be held liable unless it was proven
that its conduct was wilful and wanton negligence.
The
plaintiff amended his complaint and, relying on Harvey v.
Clyde Park District contended that section 3-106 was unconsti41
tutional as special legislation.
The court distinguished Harvey from Maloney in that the
statute involved in Harvey did not attach to other governmental
entities in similar circumstances and when they were performing a similar function, while section 3-106
applied equally to all governmental entities, and operates only where
liability of a particular governmental entity is sought to be predicated upon the existence of a condition of public property maintained by it and intended or permitted to be used
as a park, play42
ground or open area for recreational purposes.
37

47 Ill. 2d 367, 265 N.E.2d 654 (1970).

38 See generally Kionka, Tort Liability of Local Gover-nments and their

Employees in Illinois, 58 ILL. B.J., 620 (1970) ; and Latturner, Local Governmental Tort Immunity and Liability in Illinois, 55 ILL. B.J. 28 (1969).
Also, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 265 (1966).
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85 §3-106 (1965).
40
41
42

Note 37 supra.
Id.

Id. at 370, 265 N.E.2d at 655-66.
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In judicial dicta, the court followed the Harvey test and stated,
"only if it can be said that the classification is clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary will the courts act to hold
the classifying enactment invalid."' 4 3 In direct application of
the Harvey test, the court ruled that since section 3-106 was

based on the 44function of the local governmental entity it was

constitutional .

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION

3-106

In view of the consistent and patently clear applications of
Harvey, Maloney seems to be another extension. Admittedly,
section 3-106 is constitutional in the context in which it had been

attacked.

However, the decision's definitive determination and

reasoning omitted any discriminating inquiry and resulted in
a subtle undermining of the functional question.
The statute is clearly functional in application despite the
obvious classification among plaintiffs falling within the purview of the statute and those falling outside it. The fundamental
concept of the Tort Immunity Act is based on the premise that
governmental entities are different and distinct from private
persons, and that classification for the purpose of recognizing

these differences and distinctions is an expressed right of the
General Assembly." In this sense, the statute is neither an arbitrary nor capricious classification despite it being "special"
and legislating for a class on the basis of function. Moreover, the legislation is reasonable in the purpose to be achieved
and within the legislative intent of the statute.
The function covered by section 3-106 is that of providing
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Note 22 supra. See 4 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Reports, Recommendations and Studies 801-1611 (1963).
The commission summarized the
various distinctions and differences between private persons and institutions
which thus give the right of classification to the General Assembly:
Private persons do not make laws. Private persons do not issue and
revoke licenses to engage in various professions and occupations.
Private persons do not quarantine sick persons and do not commit
mentally disturbed persons to involuntary confinement. Private persons
do not prosecute and incarcerate violators of the law or administer
prison systems. Only public entities are required to build and maintain
thousands of miles of streets, sidewalks and highways. Unlike many
private persons, a public entity often cannot reduce its risk of potential
liability by refusing to engage in a particular activity, for government
must continue to govern and is required to furnish services that cannot
be adequately provided by any other agency. Moreover, in our system
of government, decision-making has been allocated among three branches
of government -- legislative, executive and judicial and in many
cases decisions made by the legislative and executive branches should
not be subject to review in tort suits for damages ....
See also Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations,4 ILL. L.Q. 28,
30 (1921).
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public property for recreational use. 46 However, the section
fails to distinguish between an injury resulting from an artificial condition and an injury resulting from a natural condition.
Rather, all plaintiffs injured by "a condition" on property used
for recreational purposes fall within the section. 47 It may be
argued that had the section distinguished between injuries
resulting from natural conditions and those resulting from
artificial conditions, an arbitrary secondary classification would
have been created. For example, had the statute confined
itself to immunity for injuries resulting solely from natural
conditions, a plaintiff injured by a natural condition may be
barred from a remedy while another plaintiff with the same
injury, resulting while playing in the same park, if injured
by an artificial condition may have a remedy. Since no distinction is made, seemingly no plaintiff is arbitrarily classified
merely due to the manner in which he was injured.
However, the artificial-natural dichotomy raises the proposition that although section 3-106 is functional as to the recreational use, it should be directed to the particular type of recreational function engaged in. Although the general function may
be recreational use, a more specific sub-functional distinction
should be made between those local public entities providing
natural conditions and those providing artificial conditions for
recreational use. A recreational facility that affords for the
users of that facility an artificial condition has in fact a different function than those recreational facilities that provide
natural conditions. Acceptance of this proposition would mean
that section 3-106 should be broken down into sub-functions.
This would create a classification among plaintiffs similarly
situated, but since such classification could be said to be reasonable in that it recognizes the intended purpose of the statute
and further evidences a reasonable dichotomy in recognition of
the realities of life," the classification would be valid and constitutional.
The court in Harvey recommended that the General Assembly use as a guideline in its formulation of a Tort Immunity
Act, the California Government Code. 49 It is interesting to note
that nowhere in the Illinois statute is there such a drastic de46 Note 39 supra.

47Id.

Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill. 2d 60, 67, 203 N.E.2d 573, 577
(1964).
49 For a general discussion of the California Government Tort Immunity
Act see Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort Liability:A Decade of Change,
U. ILL. L.F. 919, 935 (Winter 1966), Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 463 (1963).
48

1972]
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parture from the California Code as in section 3-106.50 An
analysis of the pertinent California Code provisions reveals that
a distinction in liability is made between natural and artificial
conditions as is urged above. Section 831.21 is an unqualified
grant of "blanket" tort immunity to a public entity providing
natural conditions on unimproved public property. That section is dependent upon the fundamental cognizance of the burden
and expense of both defending a multitude of claims for injuries
and maintaining the property in a safe condition. Additionally,
it recognizes the unreasonableness of permitting suits for injuries resulting from those natural conditions where the inherent
function of the public entity is to provide "naturalness" for
the public's enjoyment. 2 However, section 83553 predicates
the conditions of liability for a public entity providing artificial
conditions on the existence of a "dangerous condition." Collectively, the California statutes indicate conclusive legislative
countenance to the primary distinction between two separate
yet often coterminous functions of local public entities establishing areas for recreational use.
Therefore, it may be contended that although section 3-106
of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act is functional and not patently
"arbitrary" and unreasonable in one context, in another, the
statute may be arbitrary in that it fails to recognize the precise
sub-functions of the more general recreational function of local
public entities. The immunity granted in section 3-106 is primarily based upon the rationale that such recreational activities
will inevitably generate an endless amount of unfounded claims,
and that such public entities which exist for the benefit of the
50 Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal
Tort Immunity, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 265, 286 (1966).
51 Cal. Govn't Code §831.2 (West 1966). This section provides:
Natural Condition of Unimproved Public Property. Neither a
public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a
natural condition of any unimproved public property, including but not
limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.
52 Id., Legislative Committee Comment.
:3 Cal. Ann. Gov. Code §835 (West 1966).
That section provides:
Conditions of liability. Except as provided by statute, a public
entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property
if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition
at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the
dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that
either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous
condition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition under section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the
injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
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public should not be placed at their mercy. 54 However, such a
reason does not account for the failure to distinguish between
an activity requiring the preservation of natural conditions
and one where the condition has been created by the hands of
the entity itself. A failure to recognize this primary distinction
is a failure to recognize "the realities of life."
III.

THE FUTURE

Despite the recent Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District,55 effectively waiving the

"wilful and wanton" burden of proof required by the statute
by acquisition of insurance pursuant to section 9-103(b) of the
Tort Immunity Act, section 3-106 still remains a "functional
dilemma." The Sullivan court's recognition of the harsh effect
of the "wilful and wanton" requirement ameliorates the inequitable effect of the statute, but does not go to the constitutionality of it.

In discussing the unconstitutionality of section 3-106, the
Sullivan court for the first time did, however, recognize that a
functional dilemma may exist. The plaintiff contended that the
same type of injury as occurred to him "might also be suffered
in a court house, on a city street, or some other place under the
jurisdiction and control of a local public entity and for which
recovery could be had upon proof of negligence." In response
the court stated:
We do not question the correctness of the plaintiff's argument,
but as we said in Maloney, "the wisdom of the legislation is a
matter outside the purview of this court's inquiry," and the classification created by the General Assembly in order to encourage the
development of parks and playgrounds will not be nullified by this
court on the ground that we might have chosen another means to
achieve the desired result.56

This arresting expression of the court not only acknowledged
legislative supremacy in the area of classification, but impliedly
admitted that a better means could arguably be advanced to
replace section 3-106.
In conclusion, expanded illumination of the 1970 constitutional provision regarding special legislation may result in a
greater role played by the judiciary in this area since the deter54 Baum, Tort Liability of Local Governments and their Employees: An

Introduction to the Illinois Immunity Act, 3 U. ILL. L.F. 981, 1017 (Winter
1966).
55 5 111. 2d 274 (1972).
66 51 Ill. 2d 274, 279 (1972).
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mination of a special law is now a judicial right. 57 Hopefully,
future courts presented with the "functional dilemma" will
respond with astute and perceptive analysis rather than vague
expression of rubric or language wanting in precision. Inasmuch
as the functional concept permeates through our entire legal
system, any failure to explore it with discrimination is tantamount to judicial forbearance.
"We

might have chosen another means to
achieve the desired result."
Ira P. Gould

57 Note; Article IV, §13 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution raises the same
question of constitutionality. The 1970 Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or
can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.
This section seemingly encompasses in its broad periphery all of the
many provisions of article IV, section 22, including the granting of an exclusive or special privilege, although the same basic concept has been adopted
by the 1970 Constitution in that it forces one to ask when a general law
is applicable, the right to determine reasonableness has been divested from
the legislature and made a question for the judiciary. Thus, the "arbitrary
and capricious" test of Harvey and the functional answer seemingly have
not been altered by this new special legislation section.
For an analysis of the problems raised by article IV section 22 of the
1870 Illinois Constitution and a discussion of special legislation see Braden
and Cohen, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative
Analysis, 203, 225 (1969).
See also Committee Recommendations of the
6th Ill. Const. Conv: Style & Drafting, Committee Prop. #10 - Legislature, 58 (1970).
Further, it should be noted that although the basic test of constitutionality has remained the same, item 23 of article IV, section 22 of the 1870
Illinois Constitution which prohibited the granting of an "exclusive or special
privilege" has been stricken from the new special legislation clause. However, the item is still available in that it has been incorporated in article I,
section 2 of the Bill of Rights in the 1970 Illinois Constitution. That section
provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.

